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5072 
RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS 
Robert D. Sloane† 
4.  IS CURTISS-WRIGHT’S CHARACTERIZATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
CORRECT? 
 
THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF CURTISS-WRIGHT–
BASED THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
 
I. 
 
The editors of the Journal of the National Security Forum invited a 
contribution on the (doubtlessly deliberately) broad question of 
whether the characterization of executive power in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.1 is correct.  In a purely descriptive sense, I 
think the answer is clear.  As I have said elsewhere, whatever its 
merits, Curtiss-Wright’s robust vision of executive power “accurately 
reflects the general preeminence of the President in the realm of 
U.S. foreign affairs.”2  Whether it should, however, is of course a 
distinct question, the analysis of which begins with Curtiss-Wright’s 
more general thesis about the origin, nature, and scope of U.S. 
foreign relations power.  At the outset, it may therefore be worth 
 
       †   Visiting Associate Professor, John Harvey Gregory Lecturer in World 
Organization, Harvard Law School; Associate Professor, Boston University School 
of Law. The title of this piece has been adapted, of course, from Laurence H. 
Tribe’s well-known article entitled The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980)—for similar reasons. To paraphrase 
Tribe’s concluding inquiry about the persistence of process-based theories of 
constitutional interpretation, it might, with equal force, be asked about Curtiss-
Wright-based theories of executive power: What does “it say about our situation . . . 
that views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip upon our 
thought?” Id. at 1080. I acknowledge with gratitude the research assistance of 
Lindsay Schare. 
 1. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 2. Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An 
Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 349 (2008); see also Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth 
of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 382 & n.11 
(2000) (“It is clear, at least as a practical matter, that the President does play a 
leading role in foreign affairs, and has done so since the founding.”). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920777
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emphasizing that, with very few exceptions, legal scholars from 
across the ideological spectrum agree that Curtiss-Wright’s broad 
and general thesis about the source of U.S. foreign relations 
power—as expressed, among other places, in Curtiss-Wright—is 
misguided, to say the least.  Indeed, with the exception of the case’s 
formal holding,3 virtually every aspect of Curtiss-Wright—from its 
history to its constitutional methodology to its political theory—has 
been subjected to withering criticism.4  There is little that I can or 
would add in this regard. 
Yet in the aftermath of what many commentators see as 
unprecedented and exorbitant assertions of executive power by the 
Bush administration,5 it may be worthwhile to revisit Curtiss-Wright’s 
vision of the President in an effort to better understand both its 
message and why it continues to exert an influence out of 
proportion to its legal merits, as numerous critics have attested.6  
Perhaps, that is, the puzzle for national security law today is why 
“views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip 
upon our thought.”7  After exploring the pedigree of Curtiss-Wright, 
and canvassing some of the major criticisms directed at it, I will 
conclude by venturing a few reflections on why the opinion’s vision 
of executive power persists—both in the law and the popular 
imagination—despite its considerable flaws. 
 
 3. Even the strongest advocates of the nondelegation doctrine agree that the 
joint resolution of Congress empowering the President to criminalize the sale of 
arms to states involved in the Chaco War did not violate that doctrine.  See Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 329; see, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation 
Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and its 
Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 345–51 (2001) 
(defending Curtiss-Wright’s holding despite unequivocally rejecting its extra-
constitutional textualist rationale).  I thank Gary Lawson for this reference. 
 4. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195, 
231 (Curtis A. Bradley & Christopher H. Schroeder eds., 2009) (“[N]o one 
embraces Sutherland’s cherished theory about the twofold nature of federal power 
and the opinion probably doesn’t make sense without the theory.”). 
 5. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 134–59 (2007); 
FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 153 (2007).  
 6. Cf. Powell, supra note 4, at 231 (concluding that the real question Curtiss-
Wright poses today is “to what extent do the Constitution’s arrangements of 
institutional responsibility place foreign relations in the president’s sphere?”). 
 7. Tribe, supra note †, at 1080.  
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II. 
The origin of Curtiss-Wright’s general thesis about the source, 
nature, and scope of U.S. foreign affairs powers dates to George 
Sutherland’s early political career in Congress,8 and perhaps even 
further, to the pedagogical influence of Judge James V. Campbell, 
one of Sutherland’s teachers at the University of Michigan Law 
School, which he attended nearly sixty years before penning Curtiss-
Wright.9  In 1909, Sutherland, who then served as Utah’s junior 
Senator, wrote The Internal and External Powers of the National 
Government.10  In it, he sought to resolve a constitutional puzzle, 
which, at least for those who reject Sutherland’s solution, persists to 
this day, namely, that in the realm of “foreign relations . . . the 
Constitution seems a strange, laconic document: although it 
explicitly lodges important foreign affairs powers in one branch or 
another of the federal government, and explicitly denies important 
foreign affairs powers to the states, many powers of government are 
not mentioned.”11  
For Sutherland, however, the Constitution’s apparent lacunae 
in this regard reflected a “failure to distinguish between our internal 
and our external relations.”12  The Constitution, he argued, 
implicitly distinguishes internal from external sovereignty, as well 
as their commensurate powers.13  Within the internal realm, the 
Constitution textually enumerates the powers of the federal 
government so as to distribute internal sovereign powers between 
the union and the states,14 which, by virtue of the Tenth 
 
 8. On Sutherland’s career in Congress, see generally JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, 
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 36–100 (1951). 
 9. Id. at 226.  See also id. at 227–28 (quoting Campbell’s views and 
concluding that “it was [he] who planted in Sutherland’s brain the ideas that bore 
fruit in the Curtiss-Wright case”). 
 10. George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National 
Government, 191 N. AM. REV. 373 (1909). 
 11. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13–
14 (2d ed. 1996).  See also id. at 14 (supplying examples of unenumerated foreign 
affairs powers). 
 12. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 373–74 (emphasis in original). 
 13. See id. at 379–80 (“The powers of government must be commensurate with 
the objects of government, else only a semi-government has been created.”). 
 14. Sutherland contended that “as the powers of the general government are 
diminished those of the several State governments are extended.  Such powers are 
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Amendment, retain any residual powers that the Constitution does 
not delegate to the federal government.15  In the external or 
foreign realm, however, as Louis Henkin aptly described the 
breathtaking centerpiece of Sutherland’s view, it turns out that “the 
powers of the United States to conduct relations with other nations 
do not derive from the Constitution!”16  Rather, the powers of 
“national sovereignty inhere[] in the United States,”17 as a corollary 
of its independence as a sovereign State, quite apart from the 
Constitution’s text or subtext.18  The sovereign powers of the Union 
in relation to other States19 derive not from the Constitution, but 
from the “law of nations,”20 the old appellation for international 
law, or perhaps from what Joseph Story called “resulting powers—
resulting from the whole mass of the power of government, and 
from the nature of political society, rather than as a consequence of 
any especially enumerated.”21 
A quarter of a century before Curtiss-Wright, therefore, and well 
before his appointment to the Court, Sutherland had formulated 
the basic thesis that supplies not the rationale, but the backdrop to 
its conceptually distinct thesis about executive power.  This critical 
distinction is often overlooked in the literature.  In his 1909 article, 
generally regarded as the earliest written expression of Curtiss-
 
not lost, they are only distributed.” Id. at 375. 
 15. Id. at 379–80. 
 16. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 16. Nor is the emphasis hyperbolic. Justice 
Sutherland writes in pertinent part, “It results that the investment of the federal 
government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the 
affirmative grants of the Constitution.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).  
 17. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 376. 
 18. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. 
 19. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the several states of the union with 
the lower case and capitalize “State” to refer to nation-states, that is, foreign 
sovereign countries. 
 20. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 382 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 385 ( 
“The earlier cases upheld the right of exclusion under the ‘accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in 
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners 
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe’” (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States., 
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892))). 
 21. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 383 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1256 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. 
Hein & Co. 5th ed. 1994) (1891)). 
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Wright’s theory of foreign affairs power,22 Sutherland in fact took no 
position whatsoever on either (i) the distribution of foreign 
relations powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches or (ii) the comparative competence of the branches of 
the federal government in the realm of foreign affairs.  And it is 
proposition (ii), not (i), that supplies the only real rationale found 
in Curtiss-Wright for allocating to the executive branch the 
overwhelming majority of unenumerated sovereign foreign affairs 
powers, which the union purportedly has solely by virtue of 
international law and statehood, quite independently of the 
Constitution. 
In its earliest incarnation, Sutherland’s Curtiss-Wright thesis is 
limited to advancing this view of the extra-constitutional origin, 
nature, and scope of U.S. foreign affairs power generally.  To that 
end, he emphatically insists upon the exclusively national character 
of such powers.23  But he does not insist, as he later does, on their 
exclusively executive character (except as expressly set forth in the 
Constitution’s text).  In short, the 1909 article speaks to vertical 
federalism (between the states and the union) but says nothing 
about horizontal federalism (between the federal executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches).  Nowhere does it even imply 
presidential preeminence in foreign affairs.  At one point, in fact, 
Sutherland quotes with apparent approval James Wilson’s remark 
that “[w]henever an object occurs, to the direction of which no 
particular state is competent, the management of it must, of 
necessity, belong to the United States in Congress assembled.”24 
 
 22. With the exception, that is, of the writings of Judge James V. Campbell, 
Sutherland’s teacher at the University of Michigan Law School, whose words 
influenced the justice more than a half a century before he wrote Curtiss-Wright.  
See PASCHAL, supra note 8, at 226–28. 
 23. See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 10, at 389 (“Over external matters . . . no 
residuary powers do or can exist in the several States, and from the necessity of the 
case all necessary authority must be found in the National government, such 
authority being expressly conferred or implied from one or more of the express 
powers, or from all of them combined, or resulting from the very fact of 
nationality as inherently inseparable therefrom.”). This goes a long way toward 
explaining Sutherland’s consistent support for robust federal power abroad but 
conservative stance in relation to the scope of federal power at home in the 
context of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal and interpretation of 
the Interstate Commerce Clause in cases like A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–47 (1935). See Powell, supra note 4, at 217–19.  
 24. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 377 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
   
2011] TEN QUESTIONS:  SLOANE 5077 
 
About a decade later, Sutherland delivered the prestigious 
Blumenthal Lectures at Columbia Law School and published a 
manuscript based on them in which he largely expanded on his 
earlier article.25  Once again, nothing in the manuscript argues for 
either a constitutional imperative or practical need for executive 
preeminence in U.S. foreign affairs.  Quite the contrary, in 
Constitutional Power and World Affairs, Sutherland goes to great 
lengths to emphasize, for example, the limits of the Commander-
in-Chief Clause, which, he writes, confers “simply those [powers] 
which belong to any Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of a 
nation at war.  The Constitution confers no war powers upon the President 
as such.”26  He also admonishes his readers to be wary in general of 
the threat of executive aggrandizement that the U.S. Constitution 
enables and indeed facilitates, especially in wartime. 
Given the striking contrast between his views in 1918, as 
expressed in Constitutional Power and World Affairs, and the sweeping 
executive-power rhetoric in Curtiss-Wright nearly two decades later, 
one further illustrative passage bears quoting at length:  
The office of the President has grown in potency and 
influence to an extent never dreamed of by those who 
framed and adopted the Constitution.  Even in normal 
times, Congress has been subjected to such a degree of 
executive domination as to threaten the stability of the 
principle of departmental independence involved in the 
distribution of the several powers among the three 
branches of government.  There is a popular, ever-
increasing disposition to regard the President as a 
superior officer rather than a co-equal member of a 
tripartite organization.  In times of public danger or 
disorder this tendency is greatly accentuated, and it is 
under all conditions a matter for serious concern, fraught 
with grave suggestions of peril.  In great crises, the people 
not only turn to him as their natural leader, which he is, 
but they are coming more and more to regard him as the 
sole repository of their power which, very decidedly, he is 
not.27 
 
 25. See Powell, supra note 4, at 218. The manuscript codifying and expanding 
upon his revised lectures is GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND 
WORLD AFFAIRS (1918). 
 26. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at 73 (emphasis in original). 
 27. Id. at 75. 
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It is difficult to believe that this is the same man who would 
later refer to “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations,” and then recite a litany of examples and 
rationales in an effort to establish the need for executive 
preeminence, and often exclusivity, in the realm of foreign affairs.28  
For as Powell rightly observes, “by the standards of early twenty-first 
century debates, [in Constitutional Power and World Affairs,] 
Sutherland stated a distinctly pro-Congress view of the line between 
legislative and executive power with respect to involving the United 
States in armed conflict.”29 
 
III. 
 
Curtiss-Wright gave Justice Sutherland the opportunity to shape 
U.S. law directly and, as the years since testify, durably in a way that 
few other Supreme Court justices have enjoyed.30  The opinion 
itself has been analyzed and critiqued repeatedly,31 and so I need 
not dwell on its details at much length.  On May 28, 1934, in the 
midst of the Chaco War,32 Congress empowered the President to 
criminalize the sale of arms to the belligerents, Paraguay and 
Bolivia, provided he first (i) “finds that the prohibition . . . may 
contribute to the reestablishment of peace”; (ii) consults with 
 
 28. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(emphasis added).  See also Powell, supra note 4, at 222 (“At the heart of 
Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright is an account of the constitutional order 
reoriented from his 1919 defense of the foreign affairs authority of the national 
government (and Congress in particular) against federalism and narrow-
construction attack to an assertion of the foreign affairs authority of the president 
that stresses its independence of Congress.”). 
 29. Powell, supra note 4, at 220; cf. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. 
 30. Cf. PASCHAL, supra note 8, at 226 (“Sutherland’s success in winning the 
Court to his view of the foreign relations power was a personal triumph of 
proportions seldom encountered in judicial biography.”). 
 31. For a full account of Curtiss-Wright’s background and context, see Powell, 
supra note 4. 
 32. Bolivia and Paraguay fought the Gran Chaco War between 1932 and 1935.  
It has been largely forgotten today; it should not be.  As Powell points out, it “is 
sometimes thought of as a Western Hemisphere reprise of the First World War,” 
and in its weaponry, sheer scale of destruction, and tactics, the Chaco War 
“foreshadowed the Second World War.”  Powell, supra note 4, at 198.  The League 
of Nations’ failure to prevent or control the Chaco War also “presaged the failures 
shortly to come over the Spanish Civil War, and Italian, Japanese, and German 
Militarism.”  Id. 
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“other American Republics”; and (iii) “makes proclamation to that 
effect.”33  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt did so on the same 
day.34  The government subsequently indicted the defendants for 
violating the prohibition,35 and as relevant here, the latter argued 
in defense that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its 
power to the President.36 
To the almost certain surprise of both parties, Justice 
Sutherland began by indicating that the Court would not decide 
what was, for the administration and its lawyers, the most 
fundamental issue lurking in the case: “[w]hether, if the Joint 
Resolution had related solely to internal affairs, it would be open to 
the challenge that it constituted an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power to the Executive.”37  Instead, he framed the issue 
in terms of the paramount theme of his extrajudicial writings, 
namely, the alleged asymmetry between federal power in the 
internal and external realms: “assuming . . . that the challenged 
delegation, if it were confined to internal affairs, would be invalid, 
may it nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive 
aim is to afford a remedy for a hurtful condition within foreign 
territory?”38 
Sutherland then set out, in abbreviated form, the theory of 
U.S. foreign affairs powers he had first expressed in 1909.  He 
began by explaining that the “broad statement” that ours is a 
federal government of enumerated powers “is categorically true 
only in respect of our internal affairs,” for in that sphere, the 
Constitution “carve[d] from the general mass of legislative powers 
then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable to 
vest in the federal government.”39  But the states, Sutherland 
continued, never possessed external powers, that is, foreign 
relations powers in the first place; rather they operated, he wrote, 
as “a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency—
 
 33. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 312 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 34. Id. at 311. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 314. 
 37. Powell, supra note 4, at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 315. 
 38. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315. 
 39.  Id. at 315–16 (emphasis added). 
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namely, the Continental Congress.”40  Consequently, foreign affairs 
powers passed directly from Great Britain “to the colonies in their 
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.”41 
What follows is the first of the two core conclusions for which 
Curtiss-Wright is (in)famous: that the Constitution “did not declare 
or enumerate” the powers of the federal government in the realm 
of foreign affairs but instead “assumed them.”42  Powers that may 
fairly be characterized as external do not depend on their 
enumeration vel non in the Constitution’s text; they “vest[] in the 
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”43  
Consequently, foreign affairs powers as basic as those related to, for 
example, war, treaties, diplomatic relations, territorial acquisition, 
and immigration exist by virtue of their direct transfer from the 
Crown,44 not because of any textual delegation.  By this logic, 
Sutherland justified “a well-nigh limitless power for the federal 
government in the field of foreign relations—a power, it may be 
repeated, existing independently of the Constitution.”45 
As vulnerable to criticism as this logic may be,46 it is vital to 
 
 40. Id. at 316. 
 41. Id. 
 42. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 17; see Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (“It results 
that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external 
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.”).  
Henkin suggests that although Sutherland did not explicitly describe foreign 
affairs powers as “extra-constitutional,” that is the best reading of his history.  
HENKIN, supra note 11, at 18 n.*.  I agree.  Further support for this view may be 
found, for example, in Sutherland’s earliest article, in which he explicitly describes 
the power to acquire territory by discovery, occupation, cession, and conquest, 
which the Supreme Court had affirmed, see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 
202, 212 (1890), as “extra-constitutional” but denies that it is for that reason “un-
constitutional.” Sutherland, supra note 10, at 384. 
 43. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.  
 44. See id. 
 45. PASCHAL, supra note 8, at 223. 
 46. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 2, at 381 (“There was no theory of 
extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs at the time the Constitution was 
drafted and ratified.  To the contrary, the Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers 
understood the Constitution as the means to give the national government foreign 
relations power it would otherwise lack.”).  Sutherland’s thesis is also in 
considerable tension with Supreme Court cases stating that the “Congress and the 
President, like the courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution.”  
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(1957) (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and 
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution.”) (footnotes omitted); Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (insisting that President Truman’s 
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appreciate that the allegedly extratextual nature of foreign affairs 
powers is only the first—and not even a necessary—step in Curtiss-
Wright’s argument in favor of robust, often exclusive, executive 
power.  That the federal government rather than the states 
possesses the union’s foreign relations powers says nothing about 
how the Constitution—or sovereignty, which has now been cast as 
the real source of U.S. foreign affairs powers, including many that 
the Constitution does not enumerate—allocates those powers.47  
The genesis and persistence of Curtiss-Wright’s theory of executive 
power therefore depend as much, if not more, on the second core 
conclusion for which the opinion is often cited: that it is the 
President, not Congress or (less controversially) the judiciary, that 
possesses the vast majority of the unenumerated foreign affairs 
powers posited by Sutherland. 
 
IV. 
 
Why, after all, should this be?  The answer cannot depend, as 
the first step does, on the meaning of sovereignty, or indeed, on 
anything in the law of nations.  International law—even today,48 but 
certainly in 1936—does not require states internally to allocate 
foreign affairs powers in any particular way.49  Nor can the answer 
be historical.  While the Framers’ experience with the Articles of 
Confederation led them to establish an executive office, “the 
Framers were hardly ready to replace the representative 
 
challenged power to seize the steel mills must be found in either the Constitution 
or a statute). 
 47. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 22.  As Henkin rightly observes, except as to 
those foreign relations powers expressly allocated to one branch or another, or 
reasonably inferable from other allocations, “we are not told how the 
undifferentiated bundle of federal powers inherent in sovereignty is distributed 
among the federal branches.”  Id. 
 48. Today, some argue that international law confers upon peoples a right to 
democratic governance.  See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation 
in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539, 541 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 47 (1992); see generally 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. 
Roth eds., 2000). 
 49. See Michael Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. 
Barreme or Curtiss-Wright, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 13 (1988) (“That a nation enjoys 
certain prerogatives under international law logically says nothing about which 
branches of its government, under its domestic law, are accorded power to 
exercise them.”). 
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inefficiency of the many with an efficient monarchy.”50  The 
Constitution assigns most of its enumerated foreign affairs powers 
to Congress,51 while those “explicitly vested in [the President] are . . 
. fewer and more modest,”52 unless, of course, one accepts the 
unitary executive thesis that the Vesting Clause itself “is a grant in 
bulk of all conceivable executive power,”53 including any foreign 
relations powers not explicitly assigned to Congress.54 
But Curtiss-Wright does not suggest that Justice Sutherland 
subscribed to this thesis.  If he had, it is difficult to see why he felt 
the need to locate foreign relations powers in a source extrinsic to 
the Constitution’s text.  The real gravamen of Curtiss-Wright’s 
theory of a robust chief executive is a functional or pragmatic 
argument about the comparative competence and institutional 
suitability of the President in contradistinction to Congress.  The 
President, unlike Congress, has at his disposal, inter alia, 
“confidential sources of information,” “agents in the form of 
diplomatic, consular and other officials,” and the ability to act with 
the confidentiality, discretion, dispatch, and flexibility required in 
foreign relations.55  The combination of Curtiss-Wright’s first 
premise (the federal government’s unenumerated powers in the 
realm of foreign relations) with its second (the executive’s 
institutional advantages and suitability to exercise such powers) 
gives rise to a vision of the Presidency that surely would have 
astonished the Framers, for “it exists despite the contrary intentions 
 
 50. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 27. 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (vesting in Congress the powers, among others, to 
provide for the common defense, regulate foreign commerce, define and punish 
offenses against the law of nations, declare war, grant letters of marque and 
reprisal, make rules concerning captures, raise and support the army and navy, 
make rules for the governance of the military forces, and repel invasions). 
 52. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 31 (footnote omitted). 
 53. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 640–41 (“If that be true, it is difficult to see 
why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling 
ones.”).  But see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 29–34 (2006). 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. For a general exposition and defense of the 
unitary executive thesis, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).  But see Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1994). 
 55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21 
(1936). 
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of the Philadelphia Convention.”56 
 
V. 
 
Yet Curtiss-Wright apparently excited little comment in the legal 
community of the era.  This is, at once, understandable and 
surprising.  It is understandable because Sutherland’s thesis in 
Curtiss-Wright built on a number of nineteenth-century 
precedents,57 and his “nationalistic view” of the scope of the federal 
government’s foreign affairs powers “was hardly novel.”58  
Furthermore, in the midst of the Great Depression and the years 
leading up to World War II, constitutional argument tended to 
focus on the scope of the President’s internal powers and the 
constitutionality of certain programs forming part of the New 
Deal.59  It is nonetheless surprising that the sweeping vision of 
executive power sketched out in Curtiss-Wright prompted no serious 
debate at the time, and the first major law review article to examine 
the decision did not appear until a decade later.60 
Since then, it is fair to say that Sutherland’s general thesis has 
been thoroughly debunked.  Legal scholars and historians alike 
have eviscerated his account of constitutional history.61  And while 
Henkin is surely correct that Sutherland’s theory need not depend 
on the accuracy of his history, as he goes on to remark, “Other 
criticisms . . . are not as readily avoided.”62  In particular, most 
scholars doubt that the Framers thought the new federal 
government of the United States would possess major powers not 
set forth in the text of the Constitution.63  From the standpoint of 
political theory, “it was the heyday of Lockian philosophy,” which 
 
 56. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 67 (1991). 
 57. See Sarah Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1999). 
 58. Powell, supra note 4, at 219. 
 59. See id. at 225–26. 
 60. See id. at 227 (referencing David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An 
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946)). 
 61. See, e.g., Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An 
Interpretation, 74 J. AM. HIST. 695 (1987); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations 
Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles 
A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: An Historical Reassessment, 83 
YALE L.J. 1 (1973); Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An 
Historical Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907). 
 62. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 19. 
 63. See id. at 19–20. 
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held “that the people were sovereign and that all authority 
stemmed from them.”64  The opinion fares equally poorly as a 
matter of constitutional theory,65 which for the most part is at any 
rate “the sheerest of dicta.”66 
Also, Sutherland’s apparent conception of sovereignty, while 
colorful, obscures its complexity.  In Curtiss-Wright, he wrote: 
“Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government 
change; but sovereignty survives.  A political society cannot endure 
without a supreme will somewhere.  Sovereignty is never held in 
suspense.”67  Neither the meaning nor the accuracy of this 
conception of sovereignty is self-evident.  In the first place, at times, 
sovereignty is held in suspense.  That would be one way to describe, 
for example, Somalia’s sovereignty since the ouster of Mohamed 
Siad Barre two decades ago.  Where is the supreme will in Somalia 
today?  While that example may be anachronistic relative to Curtiss-
Wright’s era, one need not search far to find more 
contemporaneous ones.  Two years before Curtiss-Wright, the 
United States entered into a treaty with Cuba by which it locked 
into perpetuity its 1903 lease agreement rights to exercise 
“complete jurisdiction and control over” a portion of Guantanamo 
Bay, even though Cuba would retain what the parties denominated 
“ultimate sovereignty.”68  The point of emphasis is that the meaning 
of sovereignty varies, and it does not always require a Hobbesian 
supreme will.  Sovereignty, like property, is better analogized to a 
 
 64. Levitan, supra note 61, at 480; cf. Glennon, supra note 49, at 13 
(expounding the history of constitutionalism in general as “in no small part the 
history of the domestic control and allocation of sovereign prerogatives”). 
 65. See generally, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 2.  
 66. Glennon, supra note 49, at 12.  Legal scholars differ on the 
characterization of Curtiss-Wright as dicta.  Compare, e.g., KOH, supra note 4, at 94 
(“Sutherland’s key language was dicta, for Congress had passed a joint resolution . 
. . that expressly authorized the president to take the action under challenge.”), 
and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring), with Lofgren, supra note 61, at 32 (“In sum, it is incorrect 
to dismiss major segments of Curtiss-Wright as dicta.”).  In fact, it seems accurate to 
say that parts of the opinion—namely, those needlessly describing the alleged 
plenary powers of the President and comparative advantages of the executive 
institution—should be characterized as dicta, while others should not be—for 
example, the necessary premise (at least, at the time) that the nondelegation 
doctrine operates less stringently in the realm of foreign affairs. 
 67. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17 
(1936). 
 68. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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bundle of rights and competences, which can (and should) be 
disaggregated and need not be transferred or exercised by a single 
institution.69 
Furthermore, even the opinion’s functional or pragmatic 
arguments about the comparative advantages of the executive 
should be tempered.  Does the average state governor ascending to 
the Presidency obviously have a better command of diplomacy and 
foreign affairs than a senior, long-term member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, for example?  And while it is 
doubtless true that the Presidency has both inherent institutional 
advantages and effective control over the vast majority of the 
massive U.S. apparatus for diplomacy, intelligence, negotiation, 
and so forth, mere control of these instruments does not invariably 
translate into better policy.  In the context of the conflict formerly 
known as the global War on Terror, for instance, some scholars 
argue that President Bush’s refusal to consult or coordinate policy 
with Congress led to serious and avoidable errors in U.S. national 
security policy, as well as a patchwork framework for detention, 
interrogation, trial, and other aspects of the long-term conflict that 
is widely regarded as illegitimate by large sectors of the public.70  In 
terms of both legitimacy and efficiency, then, what Harold Hongju 
Koh has called the “balanced institutional participation” theory of 
national security implicit in Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown,71 
in contrast to Curtiss-Wright’s vision, may well produce 
demonstrably better results, although it bears stressing here that a 
results-oriented theory of constitutional interpretation itself would 
require a substantive defense. 
Finally, even if the executive is institutionally better suited for 
most of the foreign affairs functions of the federal government—
and that is, more often than not, accurate—it does not follow that 
he enjoys all related constitutional powers.  The Constitution 
deliberately sacrifices some efficiency in the interest of securing 
liberty.72  As Justice Brandeis wrote:  
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by 
 
 69. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8–10 (1995). 
 70. See generally BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF 
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: 
LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007). 
 71. KOH, supra note 4, at 105. 
 72. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.  The purpose 
was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable 
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental 
powers among three departments, to save the people from 
autocracy.73 
 
VI. 
 
These critiques only begin to scratch the surface of the full 
case that can be advanced against Sutherland’s views in Curtiss-
Wright, both as to the pedigree, nature, and scope of U.S. foreign 
affairs powers and as to their predominant if not exclusive 
allocation to the President.  Yet the Supreme Court continues to 
cite Curtiss-Wright as authority for a variety of diverse propositions.  
To take one recent and prominent example, in Boumediene v. Bush, 
the Court cited Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that in evaluating 
“both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose 
detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be 
accorded to the political branches.”74  The executive branch, less 
surprisingly, likewise relies on Curtiss-Wright in diverse contexts.75  
The sheer diversity of legal circumstances in which Curtiss-Wright 
arguably supplies a precedent may begin to explain why “views so 
deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip upon our 
thought[.]”76  But beyond its utility to the executive branch, the 
persistence of Curtiss-Wright—and, indeed, one might say, its 
institutionalization as part of the layman’s constitutional 
mythology—may be ascribed to at least three factors. 
 
 73. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 74. 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 
349, 351 (2005) (citing Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that the President is the 
“sole organ” of the United States in foreign affairs). 
 75. See, e.g., Brief for United States, Flores-Villar v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 
2428 (2010) (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 3392008 at *17–18 (citing Curtiss-Wright for 
the proposition that sovereignty confers upon the political branches judicially 
unreviewable power to exclude aliens and to confer or deny citizenship); 
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations 
Act to Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, 2009 WL 2810454, *7 (O.L.C.) (2009) 
(“The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation . . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress 
itself is powerless to invade it.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) 
(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319)) . 
 76. Tribe, supra note †, at 1080. 
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The first is the historical pattern of executive initiative, 
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance that Koh 
identified two decades ago.77  It is not difficult to see that same 
pattern at work in the decade since the attacks of 9/11.  Second, 
and related, crisis tends to create a public atmosphere that enables 
and often encourages the accretion of executive power, while the 
return to normalcy is seldom accompanied by the surrender of 
those executive powers acquired or exercised during crisis.  Indeed, 
it is surely one of the enduring ironies of Curtiss-Wright that its 
author, two decades before, had warned readers against the very 
vision of executive power found in the opinion.  In Constitutional 
Power and World Affairs, Sutherland called attention to the “popular, 
ever-increasing disposition to regard the President as a superior 
officer rather than a co-equal member of a tripartite organization” 
and also observed that “[i]n times of public danger or disorder this 
tendency is greatly accentuated . . . .  In great crises, the people not 
only turn to him as their natural leader, which he is, but they are 
coming more and more to regard him as the sole repository of 
their power which, very decidedly, he is not.”78 
Third, as Henkin implicitly suggests in his renowned treatise 
on foreign relations law, it may be that Curtiss-Wright persists 
because of the absence of another explanation for the 
Constitution’s notoriously opaque and laconic nature in the realm 
of foreign affairs.  Any effort to confer on Curtiss-Wright the status 
its critics suggest it merits—perhaps that of Lochner v. New York79—
will therefore require an alternative understanding of how the 
Constitution confers and allocates the federal government’s 
foreign affairs powers.  Koh’s vision of balanced institutional 
participation, in my judgment, offers one compelling alternative. 
Yet in the final analysis, reliance on Curtiss-Wright as a 
precedent for executive power does not depend on the merits of 
the opinion’s broader claims about the source and nature of U.S. 
foreign affairs powers.  Perhaps the paramount reason for its 
persistence is that critics tend to focus predominantly—and often 
exclusively—on this latter claim, leaving the former, namely, about 
the alleged comparatively greater competence of the executive 
branch relative to the other branches in the realm of foreign 
 
 77. KOH, supra note 4, 117–49. 
 78. SUTHERLAND, supra note 26, at 75. 
 79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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affairs, apparently untouched.  As I have briefly suggested, however, 
it is not obvious, a priori, that the executive branch is (invariably) 
institutionally better suited for—or (always) enjoys inherently 
greater competence than—its coordinate branches vis-à-vis each 
and every aspect of U.S. foreign policy.  Equally, even assuming that 
experience demonstrates, a posteriori, that the executive branch 
enjoys greater comparative competence in some area of foreign 
affairs, it does not logically or uncontroversially follow, as a matter 
of constitutional theory, that the President “therefore” enjoys all 
relevant powers in that area.  Both of the foregoing propositions 
must be established, by argument and evidence, not simply 
assumed or asserted dogmatically.80  For it is on the strength of 
such argument and evidence that Curtiss-Wright’s vision of executive 
power ultimately stands or falls. 
 
 
 80. For an article evincing the sort of scrutiny of these claims that I have in 
mind, see, for example, Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the 
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (2011). 
